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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
Giaquinto v. Commissioner of New York State Department of
Health'
(decided June 12, 2008)
Dominick Giaquinto, a resident of an adult care facility,
commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking, in part, that the Com-
missioner of the Department of Health ("DOH") declare him eligible
for Medicaid benefits retroactive to the date of his application and at-
torney's fees and costs pursuant to Sections 19832 and 19883 of Title
42 of the United States Code ("42 U.S.C. § 1983" and "42 U.S.C. §
1988"). The state supreme court granted the petition and found that
the DOH acted arbitrarily, capriciously and without a basis in law in
its determination to deny Medicaid benefits to Giaquinto.4 The court
vacated the DOH's determination and awarded attorney's fees to
Giaquinto. DOH appealed only the award of attorney's fees to the
Appellate Division, Third Department, which reversed the award,
holding that Giaquinto was not entitled to the award under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 because he did not prevail in his claim under 42 U.S.C. §
' 897 N.E.2d 116 (N.Y. 2008).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) provides, in pertinent part: A citizen of the United States may
bring a claim against a "person" who, under color of state law, "subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States . . .to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws."
' 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) provides, in pertinent part: "In any action or proceeding to
enforce a provision of section [ ] ... 1983 ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the pre-
vailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs ...
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1983.6 Giaquinto appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which
addressed whether the award of attorney's fees was barred by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity set forth under the Eleventh Amend-
ment7 to the U.S. Constitution. 8  The Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity was not
an obstacle to the recovery of attorney's fees in the subject action.9
However, the court remitted to the trial court for further proceedings
because the court stated that it could not conclude that the state su-
preme court in fact awarded Giaquinto relief on federal grounds.1"
In October 2004, while Giaquinto was a resident of an adult
care facility and his wife, the "community spouse," resided in the
marital home, Giaquinto applied to the Montgomery County Depart-
ment of Social Services ("DSS") to obtain Medicaid benefits for
nursing services that began on August 1, 2004.11 DSS denied the ap-
plication because Giaquinto and his wife had "household income and
resources in excess of [the] permissible limits for Medicaid eligibil-
ity.''12 Subsequently, an "Administrative Fair Hearing" was held at
which Giaquinto requested a reversal of DSS's decision to deny the
benefits and an increase in the community spouse resource allowance
6 id.
7 U.S. CONST. amend XI, states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
8 Giaquinto, 897 N.E.2d at 117.
9 Id. at 121.
'o Id. at 123.
1 Id. at 117; A "community spouse" refers to the non-Medicaid spouse who remains in
the community. The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, which set out to protect
resources for community spouses, created legislation which separates the income and assets
of spouses. This enables the community spouse to retain a certain sum of assets if the other
spouse is required to deplete assets in order to qualify for Medicaid. Id. at 118 n.2.
2 Id. at 117-18.
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("CSRA") for his wife.
13
A fair hearing decision was issued by DOH on April 15, 2005
affirming DSS's denial of Giaquinto's application and held that
Giaquinto's wife was entitled to an increased CSRA. 14 The case was
remanded to Montgomery County with direction that DSS should
calculate how much of Giaquinto's excess resources should be given
to his wife so that she could purchase a "single premium immediate
life annuity to generate sufficient income" to raise her monthly in-
come to the minimum level.' 5 Giaquinto subsequently filed an Arti-
cle 78 proceeding against DOH alleging that the determination of
DOH to require his wife to "purchase a 'single premium immediate
life annuity' was arbitrary, capricious," and in violation of state and
federal Medicaid laws. 16 Giaquinto sought the following: (1) an an-
nulment of the Fair Hearing decision; (2) a judgment directing DOH
to find him "eligible for Medicaid retroactive to the date of his origi-
nal application"; (3) a determination that his wife "could retain all of
her resources as of [the application] date"; and (4) attorney's fees and
costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.'7
The Supreme Court of Albany County found that DOH acted
arbitrarily, capriciously, and without any basis in law in calculating
the CSRA, and accordingly vacated the fair hearing decision and
13 Giaquinto, 897 N.E.2d at 118. Community spouse resource allowance refers to the
marital partner's entitlement, under federal and state law, to a minimum level of monthly
income. The sum of the CSRA is not included when determining whether an institutional-
ized spouse is eligible for Medicaid benefits. Id. at 118 n.2.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 118-19.
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DOH's April 2005 determination and awarded attorney's fees to
Giaquinto. 18 The court determined that DOH acted contrary to its
prior policy and without any explanation for doing so when it di-
rected the community spouse to purchase a certain type of invest-
ment. 19 For that reason, the court vacated the determination as arbi-
trary and lacking a rational basis.20 DOH appealed only the award of
attorney's fees to the Appellate Division, Third Department.1
On appeal, the appellate division reversed the award of attor-
ney's fees based on its characterization of the relief as retrospective
in nature and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment.2 The
court explained that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), an award of
reasonable attorney's fees is permissible to a party who prevails on a
valid federal claim. 3 Furthermore, the court noted that the judicially
created exception to the Eleventh Amendment's doctrine of sovereign
immunity24 allows state officers to be sued in their official capacity
under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 only when the petitioner seeks " 'injunc-
tive or prospective relief to prevent a continuing violation of the law.'
,,25
The appellate division conceded that the subject suit against
the Commissioner of DOH was permissible under the narrow excep-





23 Giaquinto, 897 N.E.2d at 119.
24 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment
bars "a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public
funds in the state treasury.").
25 Giaquinto, 897 N.E.2d at 119 (quoting Giaquinto v. Comm'r ofN.Y.S. Dep't of Health,
833 N.Y.S.2d 301 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2007)).
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tion to the sovereign immunity doctrine. 26 However, the court re-
jected Giaquinto's argument that the relief sought was prospective
because he sought approval of his Medicaid application and an in-
crease in his wife's CSRA, resulting in his entitlement to future bene-
fits. 27 Instead, the court stated that the relief sought was "retrospec-
tive, remedying a prior erroneous decision, even though a grant of
such relief would result in his eligibility for and receipt of benefits in
the future. 28 The court seemed to be concentrating on the form of
the relief rather than the substance of the relief, i.e., the ultimate goal
of obtaining Medicaid benefits. As a result, the appellate court held
that Giaquinto was not entitled to the award of attorney's fees be-
cause his Section 1983 claim failed. 29 Subsequently, Giaquinto ap-
pealed the decision to the New York Court of Appeals.30
At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether Giaquinto's
claim for attorney's fees from DOH pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)
was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.31 The court disagreed with
the appellate division and held that Giaquinto's relief was prospective
in nature and, therefore, the suit was not barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.32 The court characterized the claim as prospective in
that it involved Giaquinto's ongoing entitlement to "current and fu-
ture Medicaid benefits. 33 The fact that such eligibility would be ret-




30 Giaquinto, 897 N.E.2d at 119.
3' Id. at 117.
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roactive to the date of the application was subordinate and inconse-
quential to the primary relief sought.34
As the foundation for its decision, the court first recognized
the special exception to the rule that the Eleventh Amendment bars
suits against state officials as established in the Supreme Court's
landmark decision of Exparte Young. 35 The Exparte Young doctrine
provides that a state official, acting in his official capacity, may be
sued in federal court for prospective relief based on conduct that vio-
lates federal law.36 The Court held that:
If the act which the state [officer] seeks to enforce be a
violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer, in
proceeding under such enactment, comes into conflict
with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he
is in that case stripped of his official or representative
character and is subjected in his person to the conse-
quences of his individual conduct. The state has no
power to impart to him any immunity from responsi-
bility to the supreme authority of the United States.37
Based on the holding in Ex parte Young, federal courts have consis-
tently issued prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against
state officials acting contrary to federal law.
Although Ex parte Young permits federal courts to issue pro-
spective injunctive relief against state officials, the United States Su-
preme Court held in Edelman v. Jordan38 that the Eleventh Amend-
34 Id.
" 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
36 Id. at 159-60.
37 Id.
38 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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ment bars an action if the plaintiff seeks "to impose a liability which
must be paid from public funds in the state treasury. 39 In Edelman,
the plaintiffs brought a class action seeking declaratory and injunc-
tive relief against state officials responsible for administering the fed-
eral-state programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind or Disabled
("AABD"). 4' The plaintiffs alleged that the state officials were man-
aging the AABD in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as in viola-
tion of federal regulations which require that the state administrators
process AABD eligibility applications within prescribed time peri-
ods.41
The district court granted a permanent injunction requiring
that the state officials abide by the federally mandated time limits.
42
Additionally, the district court ordered the defendants to " 'release
and remit AABD benefits wrongfully withheld to all applicants for
AABD in the State of Illinois' " who applied between the date of the
federal regulations and the date of the district court's preliminary in-
junction.43
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the defen-
dants argued that the award was retroactive in nature and therefore
barred by the Eleventh Amendment because the state treasury was to
make payments to those whose benefits were wrongfully withheld.44
" Id. at 663.
40 Id. at 653.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 656.
43 Edelman, 415 U.S. at 656.
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However, the circuit court characterized the retroactive award of
monetary relief as "equitable restitution," not damages, and therefore
not violative of the Eleventh Amendment.45
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed.46 Although the Court explained that an award requiring pay-
ment of state funds necessary for future compliance with a federal
claim would not be barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court
concluded that the subject relief was an award of damages against the
State for a "past breach of a legal duty., 47 Such an award is expressly
precluded by the Eleventh Amendment.48 Edelman made it clear that
a federal court cannot order state officials to pay benefits retroac-
tively even if the benefits are wrongfully withheld because of a state
official's unconstitutional conduct.
49
In determining that the relief sought was prospective in
Giaquinto, the court relied on the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Papasan v. Allain,50 which held that the Eleventh Amendment
did not bar a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. In Pa-
pasan, the plaintiffs were local school officials and schoolchildren in
Mississippi who filed suit against state officials for allegedly violat-
ing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." The
plaintiffs alleged that in the 1850s, Mississippi mismanaged lands
held in trust for the plaintiff schoolchildren resulting in the loss of
41 Id. at 663-64.
46 Id. at 658-59.
41 Id. at 667-68.
48 Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668.
49 Id. at 651.
'o 478 U.S. 265 (1986).
"' Id. at 274.
1098 [Vol. 25
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those lands.52 The plaintiffs asserted that this past state conduct re-
sulted in the current "disparity between the financial support avail-
able to [its] schools and other schools in the State, which.., deprived
.. [its] schoolchildren of a minimally adequate level of education."53
The district court held that the plaintiffs claims were barred
by the Eleventh Amendment because the " 'only possible relief could
come only from a monetary award against the state treasury.' ,14 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the complaint, although it did so on different grounds.55 The cir-
cuit court disagreed that the plaintiffs' claims were barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, and instead recognized the possibility that
there was prospective relief available to correct the existing unequal
distribution of state funds which would not be proscribed by the
Eleventh Amendment although the plaintiff plead only retrospective
relief in the form of land or money.56
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated
the judgment of the circuit court, and remanded for further proceed-
ings.57 The Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court that the pre-
sent disparity in the distribution of state funds to school districts re-
sulted in an ongoing equal protection violation which was not barred
by the Eleventh Amendment.5 8 The Court held that the "Eleventh
Amendment would not bar relief necessary to correct [Mississippi's]
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Papasan v. United States, 756 F.2d 1087, 1092 (5th Cir. 1985).
15 Id. at 1089.
56 Id. at 1094-95.
57 Papasan, 478 U.S. at 275.
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current violation of the Equal Protection Clause" because the State's
unequal distribution of funds was "precisely the type of continuing
violation for which a remedy may permissibly be fashioned under
Young." 59 In sum, the Court held that prospective relief seeking to
end an ongoing or future violation of law was not proscribed by the
Eleventh Amendment.6 °
In Papasan, the Court set forth the rationale of the Ex parte
Young doctrine stating that:
Young's applicability has been tailored to conform as
precisely as possible to those specific situations in
which it is "necessary to permit the federal courts to
vindicate federal rights and hold state officials respon-
sible to 'the supreme authority of the United States.' "
Consequently, Young has been focused on cases in
which a violation of federal law by a state official is
ongoing as opposed to cases in which federal law has
been violated at one time or over a period of time in
the past, as well as on cases in which the relief against
the state official directly ends the violation of federal
law as opposed to cases in which that relief is intended
indirectly to encourage compliance with federal law
through deterrence or directly to meet third-party in-
terests such as compensation. . . . "Remedies designed
to end a continuing violation of federal law are neces-
sary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the
supremacy of that law. But compensatory or deter-
rence interests are insufficient to overcome the dic-
tates of the Eleventh Amendment."
. . . [R]elief that serves directly to bring an end to a
present violation of federal law is not barred by the
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61substantial ancillary effect on the state treasury.
Hutto v. Finney exemplifies another form of permissible
"ancillary" relief under the Eleventh Amendment recognized by the
Supreme Court. In Hutto, state prisoners brought an action against
state prison officials alleging that the conditions of their confinement
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment.63 The district court entered judgment for the plaintiffs
and ordered that the constitutional violations at the prison be cor-
rected.64
In subsequent hearings to supervise the remedial order, the
district court found that the prison officials "had acted in bad faith" in
failing to correct the constitutional violations and awarded attorney's
fees to be paid from prison funds.65 The State appealed to the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that paying the award of attorney's
fees with public funds was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.66
However, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the award
of attorney's fees to be paid from the state treasury for time spent ob-
taining injunctive relief against the state prison was not barred by the
Eleventh Amendment.67 The Court reasoned that such an award of
"costs" was ancillary to the federal court's power to impose injunc-
tive relief and, as such was permissible to enforce prospective re-
61 Id. at 277-78 (citations omitted).
62 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
63 Id. at 680.
64 id.
65 Id. at 684-85.
66 Id. at 689-90.
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lief.68
The Court noted the often indistinct line between retroactive
and prospective relief and rationalized the ancillary cost by stating
that:
In exercising their prospective powers under Ex parte
Young and Edelman v. Jordan, federal courts are not
reduced to issuing injunctions against state officers
and hoping for compliance. Once issued, an injunc-
tion may be enforced .... The principles of federal-
ism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine surely
do not require federal courts to enforce their decrees
only by sending high state officials to jail. The less in-
trusive power to impose a fine is properly treated as
ancillary to the federal court's power to impose in-
junctive relief.
69
Hence, the Eleventh Amendment did not proscribe an award of attor-
ney's fees against the prison officials in their official capacities.7v
The Court recognized that without the power to impose such an "an-
cillary" cost to its injunctive power, the judicial prospective power
under Ex parte Young would necessarily become ineffective.7
The New York Court of Appeals in Giaquinto additionally
addressed what it termed "the split" in the circuit court on the Elev-
enth Amendment issue as specifically applied to Medicaid. 2 Ac-
cordingly, the Court of Appeals referred to the Second Circuit Court
61 Id. at 690.
69 Id. at 690-91 (emphasis omitted).
70 Id. at 692.
7 Id. at 69 1.72 Giaquinto, 897 N.E.2d at 122.
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of Appeals decision in Tekkno Laboratories, Inc. v. Perales.73 In
Tekkno, the plaintiff was a clinical laboratory and Medicaid provider
that was notified by the Department of Social Services ("DSS") that
DSS was withholding payment of Medicaid claims submitted by the
plaintiff until the veracity of plaintiffs claims could be determined.74
The plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against DSS alleging
that DSS's "withholding of payment of these claims constituted a
deprivation of its property without due process of law.",
75
The Second Circuit reversed the district court's order, which
granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
withholding of payment of the Medicaid claims.7 6 The court's deci-
sion was based on the characterization of the type of relief sought as
retrospective in nature and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amend-
ment.77 The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that the relief
sought was " 'not compensation for the damage suffered by Tekkno,
it merely direct[ed] that the illegal deprivation shall not continue to
Tekkno's further injury.' ,78 Instead, the court stated that the injunc-
tive order "explicitly ordered the State to pay moneys out of its treas-
ury in compensation of the claims submitted by Tekkno 'prior to the
date of this order.' ,79 Since the court did not find any award of pro-
spective relief in the injunctive order, the court held that it was barred
71 933 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1991).
71 Id. at 1094.
71 Id. at 1095.
76 Id. at 1094.
77 Id. at 1098.
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by the Eleventh Amendment.80
In contrast, in Kostok v. Thomas,81 a case decided six years
later, the Second Circuit found that a Medicaid plaintiffs relief was
not violative of the Eleventh Amendment.82 In Kostok, the plaintiff
was a quadriplegic nursing home resident who received Medicaid
benefits.83 When DSS refused to pay the cost of a new customized
wheelchair to replace a fifteen-year old wheelchair that was no longer
medically nor physically sufficient, plaintiff filed an application for a
preliminary injunction against DSS's continued withholding of pay-
ment approval for the new wheelchair. 84 The plaintiffs complaint al-
leged a due process violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.85
The Second Circuit disagreed with the district court that the
relief sought was retroactive money damages and, thus, barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. 86 Rather, the circuit court stated that the relief
was "truly prospective: a wheelchair from this time forward. The re-
lief sought cannot be deemed retroactive simply because it costs
money. Kostok does not seek compensation for any suffering caused
by his use of an unsuitable wheelchair; he simply seeks the suitable
wheelchair now." 87 The court clearly stated that simply because there
is a cost to the state treasury, that alone does not necessarily render
80 Id.
81 105 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1997).
82 Id. at 69.
13 Id. at 66.
84 Id. at 66-67.
85 Id. at 68.
86 Kostok, 105 F.3d at 66.
87 Id. at 69 (citation omitted)
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the form of relief as retrospective.88 Consequently, the court held that
the plaintiffs claim was not retroactive and therefore it was not
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.89
Giaquinto also relied on the Second Circuit's recent decision
in Morenz v. Wilson-Coker,90 which similarly found prospective re-
lief in a Medicaid dispute which was not violative of the Eleventh
Amendment.9 In Morenz, the plaintiff was a nursing home resident
who made an application to DSS for Medicaid benefits.92 In order to
qualify for the benefits, the plaintiff assigned his spousal support
rights to the State, which assignment immunized the non-
institutionalized spouse's assets from inclusion when calculating
Medicaid eligibility for the institutionalized spouse.93 Despite the as-
signment of spousal support rights, DSS denied the plaintiffs appli-
cation based on the plaintiffs "combined [spousal] resources [that]
exceeded the statutory eligibility amount."94
Subsequently, the plaintiff made an application for a tempo-
rary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prohibit DSS
from including his spouse's assets in the calculation of his eligibility
for Medicaid benefits.95 The district court granted summary judg-
ment to plaintiff enjoining DSS from denying plaintiffs Medicaid
application and also ordered, in accordance with the Medicaid statute,
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 415 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2005).
91 Id. at 237.
92 Id. at 232.
9' Id. at 232-33.
94 Id. at 233.
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that the plaintiff be eligible for benefits retroactively.9 6 DSS ap-
pealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that the retroactive Medicaid
eligibility constituted retroactive relief in violation of the Eleventh
Amendment.97
The court rejected DSS's argument, finding that the order
granting benefits retroactively to plaintiff was not compensation for
the State's past violations of federal law proscribed by the Eleventh
Amendment.98 Rather, the award of retroactive benefits was simply
incidental to compliance with the "present eligibility determination
required by the Medicaid statute." 99 Since the retroactive benefits
were a necessary consequence of compliance with the prospective in-
junction, and not an award of restitution for a past breach by DSS, the
court held that the district court's order was not in violation of the
Eleventh Amendment.
00
When determining if an award against a sovereign is barred
by the Eleventh Amendment, the New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion in Gianquinto is in line with the trend of Second Circuit deci-
sions, which focus on the substance of relief, rather than the form of
relief. In other words, the recent decisions appropriately recognize
the primarily prospective nature of entitlement to benefits in the fu-
ture and do not bar a claim as violative of the Eleventh Amendment
simply because there is an additional ancillary or incidental retroac-
tive award. For instance, in Giaquinto, the substantive award re-
96 Id.
9' Id. at 233-34.
9' Id. at 237.
99 Id.
100 Morenz, 415 F.3d at 237.
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suited in plaintiffs ongoing entitlement to current and future Medi-
caid benefits, which is clearly prospective in nature. The fact that the
award also included Medicaid eligibility retroactively to a date prior
to the award was not fatal to the constitutional claim because it was
merely incidental to the substantive relief awarded.
Permitting such ancillary retrospective relief is likely to be an
inevitable consequence of adhering to the Ex parte Young doctrine.
An injunctive order against a state official to correct a constitutional
violation prospectively may permissibly result in a fiscal conse-
quence on the state treasury. As evidenced by the cases herein,
awards paid from the state treasury are permissible when they are a
necessary result of compliance with court orders, which by their
terms are prospective in nature. Because it is unlikely that courts will
deviate from the landmark decision of Ex parte Young, future court
decisions on this Eleventh Amendment issue will most likely follow
the reasoning of the court decisions discussed herein.
Although Judge Theodore T. Jones, Jr. in Giaquinto charac-
terized the holding in Tekkno as contrary to the more recent Second
Circuit holdings in Morenz and Kostok, it can be argued that the hold-
ing in Tekkno was actually consistent with the court's subsequent de-
cisions on the Eleventh Amendment issue. Following the Supreme
Court's holding in Edelman, Tekkno held that a federal court cannot
order state officials to pay benefits retroactively even if the benefits
are wrongfully withheld because of a state official's unconstitutional
conduct. Since the plaintiff in Tekkno was terminated as a Medicaid
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to DSS, there was no possible prospective relief which could be
granted by the court.10' Hence, the injunctive order to pay the Medi-
caid claims retroactively was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
10 2
Therefore, the reasoning of the courts' holdings in Morenz, Kostok,
and Tekkno can be viewed as consistent with each other.
As mentioned in Giaquinto, there is ample reason for the New
York Court of Appeals to continue to follow the Second Circuit
precedent on this Eleventh Amendment issue. Most notable is the
federal-state nature of the Medicaid program, which allows claims to
be brought in both state and federal courts. Consistent holdings be-
tween the state and federal courts would allay any forum shopping
concerns and ensure that claimants will not face inconsistent substan-
tive law in the federal and state courts.
Heather Wine
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SEARCH & SEIZURE
United States Constitution Amendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
New York Constitution article I, section 12:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
19
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